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This paper investigates Russia's system of environmental
management, especially economic tools used to control pollution.
It also describes the Russian experience with a system of
pollution fees.  In particular, we consider how the system of
pollution fees works, how fee levels are set, the incentive
properties of the fees, and the ultimate use to the Russian
government of the revenue from the emission fees.  Although the
emission fees are quite substantial for some pollutants, the
incentive properties of the fees are almost nonexistent.  The
primary purpose of pollution fees is to generate funds for
state-owned enterprises to invest in pollution abatement
equipment.  This is substantially different from the operation of
a pollution fee in the West.
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This paper investigates Russia's system of environmental
management, especially economic tools used to control pollution.
It also analyzes the process by which Russia formed and operates
a system of pollution fees.  Our analysis covered four years,
beginning in 1989 with the USSR's two-year experiment with
pollution fees in approximately 50 regions.  It ended in 1993
when a system of pollution fees was in operation throughout
Russia.  We focus on air pollution, identifying existing
liability mechanisms for environmental problems and analyzing
economic incentives for regulating environmental pollution.
An administrative system of environmental management that
corresponded to the Soviet system of economic regulation existed
in Russia until 1990.  Then economic reforms eliminated this
mechanism and forced the government to structure a new regulation
system based on economic tools.  We try to answer these
questions:
* What incentives entice polluting enterprises to reduce their
emissions?
* What are the positive outcomes of this system?
* What will increase its efficiency?
Of course, the system has not been operating long enough for an
in-depth analysis.  Therefore, we compensated for a lack of
empirical data by analyzing indirect factors and experts'
estimates.  Even with these shortcomings, this investigation is
important as Russia incorporates environmental protection into
its emerging free market system.  Soon, the only tools for
assessing environmental liability will be legalized economic
mechanisms linked to a system of environmental standards.
As privatization gives many rights to new owners, there is a
danger that the balance between the rights of these owners and
their environmental liabilities will shift to favor business.
Weaknesses within the economic and legal systems could contribute
to this shift.  If this occurs, the environment will be the
loser.  Does the existing system of fees create sufficient
incentives for firms to invest in environmental protection?  Arethere more effective ways to encourage businesses to maintain
environmental standards?  Answers to these questions must take
into account the market system now forming in Russia.  This work
is an attempt to use United States methods to analyze the Russian
system of managing environmental protection.
THE COMMAND-AND-CONTROL SYSTEM OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Formerly, the USSR used a command-and-control system of
environmental regulation.  It involved a centralized
determination of exactly what pollution control measure each firm
or factory must adopt.  This system of environmental management
consisted of several elements:
* a system of environmental quality standards,
* a system for planning and financing environmental controls, and
* a system for monitoring and controlling environmental quality.
Several legislative acts established the main features of the
command-and-control system and spelled out the responsibilities
of various environmental protection ministries and organizations.
Beginning in 1968, the USSR Politburo adopted several fundamental
acts [note 1] governing the exploitation of the environment and
natural resources:
* the Fundamental Land Management Act of 1968,
* the Fundamental Water Management Act of 1970,
* the Fundamental Mining Management Act of 1975,
* the Fundamental Forests Act of 1977,
* the Atmospheric Air Protection Act, and
* the Wildlife Protection and Utilization Act of 1980.
The USSR leaders set their environmental protection goals in the
1969 Fundamental Public Health Act.  THE CONSTITUTION (THE MAIN
LAW) OF THE USSR first mentioned the necessity of protecting the
environment in 1977.
The System of Environmental Quality StandardsIn accordance with the Public Health Act (USSR Supreme Soviet:
1969), the Ministry of Public Health devised and adopted
environmental quality standards.  Ambient standards played a key
role.  In the
USSR, the system of standards was the Maximum Permissible
Concentration of hazardous substances in the ambient environment
(atmosphere, reservoirs, and soils).
Introduced in 1969, the standards assumed that pollution at
Maximum Permissible Concentration levels corresponded to the
maximum amount of pollution the atmosphere could absorb without
causing damage to the environment or to people.  The Ministry has
set these standards for more than 200 substances.  Examples of
average daily Maximum Permissible Concentration standards for
urban areas (in mg/m cubed) include:
* sulphur dioxide - 0.05,
* chlorine - 0.03,
* hydrogen sulfide - 0.008,
* carbon monoxide - 3.0,
* nitrogen oxide - 0.04, and
* particulates (nontoxic), 0.15 (USSR Statistical Committee:
1989-1990).
The Ministry established these standards based on medical
requirements without concern for economics or other factors.  The
standards are more severe than those in many other countries
(Russian Statistical Committee 1994) [note 2] and are mostly
unattainable.  According to 1980s data, polluting enterprises
exceeded Maximum Permissible Concentration standards by an
average factor of 2.5 or two and a half times worse than the law
allows.
The cities of the former USSR had the most severe problems.  For
example, 16 large towns exceeded the Maximum Permissible
Concentration for dust emissions by more than 3 times as much as
the law allows [note 3].  Fourteen cities exceeded sulfur dioxide
standards by a factor greater than three [note 4]  According to
the Atmospheric Air Protection Act (USSR Supreme Soviet 1980),
cities could attain Maximum Permissible Concentration levels by
specifying Maximum Permissible Levels of emissions for stationary
pollution sources.  The act also established standard
concentrations of harmful substances for mobile emission sources.
But the act only controlled auto emissions of carbon monoxide.
Automotive fuel standards regulated lead and sulfur emissions.
These permissible levels applied to new as well as operating
businesses.  The State Hydro-Meteorological Committee and the
Ministry of Public Health calculated the standards.  TheAtmospheric Air Protection Act introduced the standards to the
USSR [note 5] on Jan. 1, 1980.  But as with Maximum Permissible
Concentrations, the Ministry enacted Maximum Permissible Level
standards without considering the economic situation.  They
proved more optimistic than realistic.  As emissions continued at
substantially higher levels than marginal standards, the Soviet
Ministry recognized that strict permissible level observance
would force most industries to close.
To prevent the accompanying economic upheaval, the USSR Council
of Ministers adopted, by special decision, Temporary Coordinated
Levels of emissions (USSR Council of Ministers 1980).  These
policies made it possible for enterprises to gradually cut back
emissions to comply with the permissible level.  Policymakers
developed special emission reduction programs for large
enterprises.  These programs also considered all abatement costs.
These temporary policies, therefore, represented a compromise
between environmental and economic goals.  Initially, the
Ministry fixed marginal permissible levels of emissions and
Temporary Coordinated Levels of emissions for the largest
enterprises only.  Only 14 to 18% of all polluting enterprises
had such standards from their introduction until the start of the
pollution fee experiment.
The System of Planning and Financing Environmental Efforts
Beginning in 1982, environmental planning became part of business
production plans, general city development plans, and regional
industrial location and development schemes.  Plans included the
step-by-step attainment of Maximum Permissible Levels for each
enterprise.  Polluting enterprises needed to first achieve the
temporary levels and then, gradually, the maximum.  Thus, all
affected enterprises had to build special investment limits into
their production plans.  These investments were their main
abatement activities and had to be sufficient for them to first
reach the temporary and then the maximum levels.  They were
worked out by corresponding Ministries of the USSR and Soviet
Republics on the basis of executive authorities of regional and
local legislatures.  A draft document for a 15-year environmental
protection and rational natural resource use program incorporated
the concept.  This Long-Term Ecological Program went into effect
in 1990 with the goal that all Soviet enterprises would comply
with Maximum Permissible Levels by 2005 (USSR State Committee on
the Scientific and Technological Development 1980).
>From 1981 to 1990, different regions and towns developed one- and
five-year abatement activity and economic development plans.  The
USSR State Planning Committee set state investments for
environmental protection.  It recommended the Long-Term
Ecological Program as the primary environmental document.  And
the Regional Complex Schemes of Environmental Protection
established the groundwork for the Program.  Since 1984, these
state-financed schemes were the primary environmental documentsfor the most polluted regions such as Lake Ladozhskoe and Lake
Baikal.  The schemes stipulated that abatement costs for
enterprises would be separate from expenses.
Funds for abatement were allocated to enterprises from the budget
of a corresponding branch of a Ministry after its budget was
coordinated with the state organizations responsible for
environmental protection.  The state agencies included the
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Water
Management, Ministry of Fish Resources Management, State
Committee of Hydro-Meteorology, Ministry of Public Health,
Ministry of Energy, and the State Committee for Mineral Deposits.
Funds for improving the infrastructure, such as sewage systems,
came from local budgets and contributions from industry seeking
to build new production facilities.  Thus, the State Planning
Committee of the USSR determined the total abatement costs.  The
Committee distributed part of the money among ministries that, in
turn, distributed it proportionally among enterprises that had
filed claims.  The Committee then distributed remaining funds
among the regions.  Further, enterprises could take abatement
expenses from the regional environmental program resources.  The
funds increased after 1984.  Also, enterprises could allocate
their resources for infrastructure construction (see figure 1).
Figure 1.  Allocation of Money for Environmental Uses
The reallocations were intended to help industries attain
environmental standards.  Every year, the appropriate ministry
informed enterprises about their emission reduction goals.  The
ministry also instructed them about their corresponding
investments and limits on using investment resources such as
capacities of construction organizations and materials.  In this
way, the government planned financial and physical aspects of
environmental control.
After the USSR Council of Ministers Environmental Protection
decision in 1978, all construction projects had to meet certain
environmental standards.  Officially, large projects had to
undertake an Environmental Impact Assessment.  However, the USSR
State Construction Committee really decided what environmental
requirements they had to meet.
Finally, in 1989, policymakers consolidated environmental
expertise into the State Environmental Committee.  Before then,
the State Planning Committee and State Construction Committee of
the USSR performed similar functions.
Monitoring Environmental Quality and Control
Policymakers assigned the tasks of monitoring and controlling
environmental quality to the state organizations mentionedearlier.  The State Committee for Hydro-Meteorology became
responsible for monitoring ambient pollution levels.  The
Ministry of Public Health dealt with toxins and hazardous
substances including food contamination.  Before the State
Environmental Committee's formation in 1989, these ministries
were responsible for controlling air quality.  They were
responsible for establishing Maximum Permissible Levels and
Temporary Coordinated Levels, controlling compliance, granting
emission permits, monitoring the environment, and providing
dissipation information.
These ministries had inspection services with limited rights to
penalize polluters.  After a 1982 decision by the USSR Presidium
of Supreme Soviets, they became the primary administrative units
for  protecting air quality.  Their enforcement tools included
penalties (a maximum of 100 rubles), with the official ruble
exchange rate at 1 ruble = $1.6 US, criminal proceedings
(rarely), and business closures (almost never).
Estimating the Effectiveness of the Command-and-Control
Management System
As many Russian specialists have mentioned, the command-and-
control system of environmental management, which lasted from
1980 to 1991, did not create sufficient incentives to improve
abatement activities.  Nevertheless, since 1980, harmful air
emissions have declined steadily despite increases in the
production of goods (see table 1).
Table 1. Comparing Changes in Harmful Emission Volumes and
Produced National Income in Real Prices
                          Former USSR                  Russia
      1976  1980  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
_________________________________________________________________
Total emissions
      76.7  72.8  86.3  66.5  64.3  61.7  59.6  62.2  31.8  28.2
from stationary sources (mil. ton)
                                                (34.1)+
GNP (bil. rubles)
      525*  619  777    799    825   875   943  1000  1300  180
                                                (644)**,+
Deflator                                        108.6   90  2500
_________________________________________________________________
 * Estimated
** For Russia, only Gross Domestic Product is represented in the
statistical surveys.  It is approximately equal to the Gross
National Product for Russia.  + Russia
Source: Calculated on the basis of USSR Statistical Committee
1985, 1988, 1989, 1990
We believe the 1990 emission increase could be the result of
better monitoring and more complete analyses following the USSR's
pollution fee experiment.  The pollution abatement investment
data in figure 2 show, in real prices, that investments grew from
1976 to 1979, declined between 1980 and 1985, then grew again
until 1991, and have been falling ever since.  To understand the
reductions from 1980 to 1985, consider the cost dynamics of
creating and installing special equipment that captures gases and
renders them harmless.
Figure 2.  Environmental Protection Investments for the Former
USSR (in real prices)
Base year for prices: 1984
Source:  USSR Statistical Committee, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990,
1992, 1993
Table 2 shows that the number of air pollution abatement
facilities built and installed dropped between 1981 and 1985
compared with 1976 to 1980.  At the same time, the minimum
specific abatement capacity cost per unit was a low 4.5
rubles/m cubed/hour for gas.  The cost per unit decrease for
absorbed
gases from new Temporary Coordinated Levels presented an
opportunity to account for the marginal abatement cost curves for
each pollution source.  Thus, emission reductions were
distributed among enterprises more efficiently.
Table 2.  "Investment" in Air Pollution Abatement
Period           1976-80  1981-85  1986-90  1990  1991  1992
_________________________________________________________________
Gas Abatement Facilities (per million cubic meters of gas/hr.)
                   20.4     20.0    22.5    16.4   8.2  5.6
_________________________________________________________________
Source: Tietenberg 1992
Abatement investments grew between 1985 and 1990 because the
Regional Complex Schemes of Environmental Protection enacted in
1984 began to take effect.  Businesses required additional
investments to comply with the schemes.  Regional channels for
distributing centralized environmental investments supplemented
industrial ones.  The federal budget provided resources through
the ministries and regional budgets.  This period was the peak of
the command-and-control management systems.Command-and-control corresponded to the general planned economic
management system.  Its disintegration in 1991 and 1992
corresponded with that of the planned economy.  If command-and-
control had continued, the Maximum Permissible Levels fixed by
the Long-Term Ecological Program (USSR State Committee on the
Scientific and Technological Development 1980) would have been
achieved by 2005.  But they would have needed many more abatement
investments.  Experts estimated that abatement investments would
have had to increase 2.2 to 2.9 times (USSR State Committee on
the Scientific and Technological Development 1980).  Though the
command-and-control system produced some positive results, it was
expensive.  The systems of environmental planning and management
did not encourage businesses to seek the cheapest methods to
comply with Maximum Permissible Levels.
Although command-and-control did not solve the former USSR's
environmental problems, it did prevent some deterioration of
environmental quality.  Its influence on polluting enterprises
was marginal, yet tangible.  How will the disintegration of
command-and-control affect environmental protection?  Is the
influence of the new system, just now taking shape, comparable to
the old?  What will happen to pollution dynamics after the
Russian economic crisis?
In 1988, All-Union and Russian Environmental Committees began to
manage pollution control.  In 1989, the All-Union Committee
organized an experiment for introducing pollution fees.  In 1991,
the pollution fees began to operate throughout the former USSR.
Also in 1991, the Russian Environmental Committee became the
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, and
its responsibilities increased.  In 1992, policymakers adopted
the Russian Law on Environmental Protection, and the Ministry
continued to create modern institutions and mechanisms for
environmental management.
THE 1989-1990 EXPERIMENT
At the end of the 1980s, policymakers realized that command-and-
control would not survive the transition to a market economy.
Transition to a new system of managing environmental protection
became an obvious need.  Why did a command-and-control system
operate successfully in the United States market economy but fail
in the USSR?  The reason lies in the differences in the command-
and-control systems.  In the United States, the government
concentrated on setting ambient and technological standards, then
worked with the judicial system to enforce them.  In contrast,
the Soviet government emphasized abatement investments.  Although
policymakers in the USSR set emissions standards, they were
seldom met.  The basis of the Soviet command-and-control system
was centralized materials and financial provisions for
environmental investments.  Therefore, when the system ofcentralized planning and finance collapsed, so did the command-
and-control system.
The Soviets recognized that their administrative mechanism for
controlling pollution was inefficient and likely to become more
so.  Its scientists and managers also knew that during the
transition to a market economy, they badly needed to create new
methods of environmental protection.  As a result, the USSR State
Environmental Committee began a system of pollution fees for air
pollution, water pollution, and solid waste disposal.  From 1989
to 1990, they conducted an experiment involving about 50 former
USSR regions, including many severely polluted cities such as
Moscow, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhje, and Nizhny Tagil.
The Committee carefully planned the experiment to provide
representative results.  The participating regions varied in
their geography, climate, natural resources, economic conditions,
industries, and population.  In Russia, for example, researchers
conducted the experiment in such cities as Moscow and St.
Petersburg which have:
* 10% of the population,
* most industrial production, and
* pollutant emissions (except carbon dioxide) at 1,153,000 t/yr.
(Moscow) and 608,300 t/yr. (St. Petersburg).
Tver, Vologda, Cherepovets, Kostroma, and Jaroslavl from the
European region of Russia also participated.  Several of these
cities are industrialized and polluted.  In Jaroslavl, emissions
average 309,700 t/yr.  In Cherepovets in Vologda region, home to
Russia's biggest metallurgical plant, emissions reach 741,700
t/yr.
Though most of the regions were in Russia and the Ukraine,
researchers assured geographical diversity by including the
Siberian regions (Kemerovo, 202,000 t/yr. of emissions and
Nizhniy Tagil in the Ural, 668,500 t/yr.).  Regions containing
unique natural objects, such as the Irkutsk region which contains
Lake Baikal, also participated.  Annual emissions in Irkutsk
average 156,600 t/yr.
The legal basis for the experiment was a decision by the USSR
Council of Ministers.  Local authorities resolved questions of
regional participation.  Although central and local Soviet
authorities endorsed the experiment, they actually had no legal
foundation for imposing effluent fees.  Enterprises could, and
often did, refuse to pay.  Therefore, environmental authorities
had to find indirect ways to control such enterprises.  One way
was to require them to submit projects to an environmental
authority for approval.  The authorities could withhold their
approval until the enterprise had paid all of its outstanding
pollution fees.
During the experiment, the government tested several methods forcalculating and collecting pollution fees but preferred two.  The
first method measured economic damage, and the second calculated
regional environmental management costs.
The Problem of Damage Estimation: Pollution Fees
Damage estimation was the basis for the first method for
calculating pollution fees.  The Central Economics and
Mathematics Institute in Moscow and the Sumskoy (now Ukraine)
Physical-Technical Institute led the efforts to develop estimates
for economic damage from environmental pollution.  The foundation
for these investigations were cause-and-effect analyses.  In
these types of analyses, researchers try to trace emissions of
harmful substances from their sources to their concentration
points in the atmosphere (reservoir) to real damage and
ultimately to economic damage (Russian Statistical Committee
1994, State Committee of the USSR for Science and Technology
1983, and Gofmana 1977).  Russian economists working with
biologists, physicians, and meteorologists had conducted these
cause-effect analyses for more than 20 years.
The first step in these analyses examined the total volume and
structure of emissions.  They used dispersion models to measure
concentration.  For atmospheric emissions, the researchers
considered such factors as the source location, the pipe height,
wind direction, and topography [note 6]  They calculated
dissipation for projected new emissions sources to estimate their
influence on economic activity.
Using concentrations of harmful substances, they estimated the
real influence of the pollutants on the environment and the
economy.  To estimate damage, they considered the following types
of influences:
* worsening quality of life (including recreation, health, and
mortality),
* diminishing service life of real assets such as buildings,
* increasing concentrations of hazardous substances in air (or
water) used in production, and
* diminishing agricultural crop capacity and slowing forestry
biomass growth.
>From empirical data, they constructed functional dependencies
between concentrations of harmful substances or emissions and
values of physical indices such as cooperative productivity.  The
Sumskoy Physico-Technical Institute conducted most of these
investigations.  Last, researchers introduced monetary valuations
of physical loadings on the environment into the analysis.
This approach toward calculating pollution fees was verycomplicated to put into practice.  First, the USSR regulated all
prices.  Therefore, prices did not reflect the economic value of
resources.  This pricing policy contradicted the laws of the
marketplace.  For example, agriculture had differentiated
purchase prices in order to extract excess profit with the help
of prices.  Under this system, if land costs in regions A and B
were equal but soil productivity in region A was twice that of
region B, then the purchase prices in region A were twice those
in region B.  This plan required farmers to sell their crops to
the state.  This system of pricing is, of course, impossible to
use in assessing damage.
The second reason it was difficult to estimate damage from
pollution was that the objects of evaluation included health and
mortality.  It is difficult, even in a market economy, to find
adequate economic indices to evaluate these factors.
The further development of methods for estimating economic damage
from pollution followed two directions.  First, work has
continued on detailed, sector-specific, damage estimates.  For
example, to estimate harvest losses, researchers calculated
marginal costs.  To estimate health losses, they calculated the
costs of preventing disease.  Alternatively, they proposed an
approach that uses a simpler, standardized method of estimating
damage.  In this approach, researchers assumed damages to be
proportional to aggregate emissions.  They used proportionality
factors to develop several techniques.
Policymakers can find explanations of the various methods of
calculating coefficients in different books (Gofman and Gusev
1977).  But beginning in 1983, researchers assembled these
methodologies and published them in the RULES FOR THE DAMAGE
ESTIMATION (Gofman, Gusev, and Balatsky 1986; and Gofman, Gusev,
Balatsky, Golub, Lemeshev, Mudretsov, and Ushakov 1987).
The standard way to calculate damage is by using a single
formula:
                     Mu = Gamma x Sigma x M                  (1)
where Mu is estimation of damage; Gamma is monetary assessment of
one ton of conventional aggregated emissions; Sigma is a special
coefficient for accounting for regional features, and M is an
index of aggregated emissions.  Further,
                     M = A1 m1 + A2 m2 + ...                 (2)
where mi is total volume of the i-substance emissions and Ai is
the coefficient of comparable danger of the i-substance.  The
guidebook mentioned above lists all possible meanings of Ai in
equation (2) (Rules 1986, 1987).  By means of the Ai, one could
aggregate various harmful substances and discount them to
conventional types of emissions.  There are different ways to
define the Ai.  The first approach sets the Ai to the reciprocal
of the Marginal Permissible Concentration of the pollutant.  An
alternative approach takes into account more complicated
correlations between pollution and human health, pollution andland fertility, and so on.  Explanations of the methods for
calculating coefficients Ai,   are elaborated elsewhere (Gofman
and Gusev 1977).
Thus, it is possible to use the RULES for point sources of
pollution, and on this basis, calculate approximate levels of
damage.  These methods for calculating damages are guidelines and
may differ dramatically from more rigorous case-by-case
assessment of damage levels.  The rules have the advantage of
simplicity and ease of use.
All empirical attempts to evaluate   failed.  For that reason,
economists proposed to set   to the economy-wide aggregate
marginal abatement cost (capital costs).   For example, for the
period 1982 to 1985, they proposed to let   equal 2.5 rubles/t of
conventional emissions.  It was to increase 3 rubles/t over a
5-year period.  Then   was approximately equal to the marginal
abatement cost.  Because this formula measures control costs and
not damages, economists could not use it for calculating the
level of abatement cost efficiency.  But the approach's
simplicity resulted in its being actively used during the late
introduction of a pollution fee system.
Second Method of Calculating Fees: Sharing Abatement Costs
The existing methods for calculating pollution fees have several
problems.  The worst problem is that none of the damage payments,
in the cities using this method, have correlated with the
calculated damage value because enterprises have been unable to
pay. For that reason, economists have proposed a second approach
for calculating pollution fees.  This new approach first defines
the cost necessary to realize a program of regional pollution
control (K).  Next, the government calculates payments for each
polluter based on its share of abatement costs:
                       Pj = K Mj/M                           (3)
where Pj is emissions fee, Mj is emission of the j-polluter, and
M is total emissions.
The payments calculated by formula (3) were 10 to 15 times lower
than the level of incurred damage calculated using damage
estimates.  Two case studies illustrate the two approaches.  One
method was used in Vologda, the other in Moscow.  The following
explanation clarifies the difference between the first and the
second approach.
To calculate the value of conventional emissions, we used
equation (2).  If we compare formula (1) and (3), then is the
marginal abatement cost and K/M is the average abatement cost.
If the function of abatement cost is linear, then   and K/M
coincide.
In recent years, experts' estimates prevailed in direct methodsof damage calculation.  One of the latest examples is an expert's
damage estimate from a national report about the Russian
environment.
To create the necessary incentives for enterprises to curtail
emissions, the government proposed a special system of limits.
For emissions within the standard, they calculated payments using
formula (1) or (3), yielding a common tariff.  They assessed
emissions exceeding the limits at a higher penalty tariff.  They
set each plant's tariff individually.  It was equal to the ratio
between the investments the enterprise needed to reduce emissions
to the Temporary Coordinated Level and the total amount of
emissions needing reduction.
They defined the penalty j as
             Rho j = Delta Kj over Delta Mj                  (4)
where Kj is investments foreseen for the j-enterprise for
emissions reduction by the amount Mj.  They levied the fee j on
the difference between actual emissions and the Temporary
Coordinated Levels.
The main reason for calculating fees based on formula (3) lies in
its construction.  That is, the government calculated the cost to
meet environmental goals for each locality.  The costs differ
from region to region.  To calculate penalties, one should know
the cost for each enterprise.  Unfortunately, obtaining such data
is nearly impossible.  Therefore, in 1992, policymakers
simplified the method.  The Russian Council of Ministers decided
to adopt single payment rates for the entire Russian territory
although the rates may differ according to local policy.
However, local authorities could use different approaches for
different polluters, especially when they took into account
regional conditions.
The experiment demonstrated that it was possible to determine and
sometimes collect pollution fees.  But it also revealed numerous
implementation problems.  The main problem was not having a legal
basis for collecting fees.  The executive decision was an
indirect basis for collecting them.  Therefore, it did not stand
up in legal actions against polluters who refused to pay.  Even
so, beginning in 1991, Russia implemented pollution fees
throughout the country.
RUSSIAN SYSTEM OF POLLUTION FEES IN 1991
In 1991, the Russian government introduced fees for stationary
and mobile air pollution sources, water pollution, and solid
waste disposal.Legal Basis
A 1991 decision by the Russian Council of Ministers established
the legal basis for pollution fees and their implementation.
The decision adopted fees for 1991 and stressed it would collect
fees from all polluters independently of their institutional
position whether government-owned or private.  The decision
opened the possibility of reducing some regional fees due to
environmental and economic conditions by negotiating among
parties and adopting to local conditions.  It made a special
provision to include environmental protection costs in their
calculations.
Fee Rates
Supplements to the decision included rates of fixed fees.  There
were two rates for water and air pollution--one for emissions
below the limit and another for emissions above the limit.  Fees
for above-limit emissions were five times greater than for below-
limit emissions.  Tables 3 and 4 show fee examples.  The decision
established pollution fees for atmospheric emissions of 211
substances.
Table 3.  Fees for Selected Air Pollutants, 1991
                          Fee rate (rubles/ton)
Pollutant  ------------------------------------------------------
                        allowed emissions   above-limit emissions
_________________________________________________________________
NO                            55.01                  263.39
Sulpher Dioxide               66.00                  316.00
Pb                        10,999.89               52,666.14
Dust (timber, lime, coal)     22.01                  105.39
CO                             1.09                    5.21
Benzopyrene            3,300,000.00           15,800,000.00
_________________________________________________________________
Source: Russian Council of Ministers 1991
In the same way, the decision fixed water pollution fees for 92
pollutants on the basis of two rate types (table 4).  It also
fixed fees for above-standard emissions for 33 pesticides.  The
Council of Minister decision did not levy fees on
technologically-approved amounts of pesticide because of unstable
economics in agriculture.
Table 4.  Fee for Selected Water Pollutants, 1991
                              Fee rate (ruble/kg)Pollutant  ------------------------------------------------------
                     below-limit discharge  above-limit discharge
_________________________________________________________________
Aluminum hydrate               8.870                 46.934
Aniline                    4,435.000             23,467.000
Vanadium (V)                 443.500              2,346.700
Oil                           44.350                234.670
Arsenic                        8.870                 46.934
Phosphates                    17.740                 93.868
_________________________________________________________________
Source: Russian Council of Ministers 1991
For mobile sources, the Council calculated the fee per ton of
fuel.  Fees were 6.83 rubles/t for diesel fuel, 5.10 rubles/t for
petrol without lead, and 8.40 rubles/t for petrol with lead.  The
price of one ton of retail petrol was 400 rubles/t, with the fee
representing 2.1% of the price.  The price of wholesale petrol
was about 1200 rubles/t, with the fee comprising 0.7% of the
price.
Finally, the Council decision set fees for solid waste disposal,
dividing the wastes into four classes according to their risk.
Disposing of one ton of solid waste at the highest risk level
cost 100 rubles.  Nontoxic solid wastes cost one ruble/t.
The essential feature of the pollution fee system was its
uniformity, independent of location.  But, the regions had
different abilities to absorb and compensate for pollution.  For
that reason, the Council introduced a special correction factor,
similar to   in equation (1), to account for regional
differences.  Policymakers multiplied the previously-mentioned
pollution fees by the correction factor.  For air pollution, the
country was divided into 11 regions.  The Far Eastern Region had
a correction factor of one for air pollution.  The Ural Region
had a correction factor of two.  For water pollution,
policymakers divided the area into 99 water regions.
Correction factors solved only part of the problem.  As mentioned
earlier, one of the main goals of the pollution fee system was to
create independent funding sources for regional environmental
programs.  For that reason, policymakers linked fee rates with
regional financial demands.
Environmental Funds
The system of environmental funds had three levels: local,
republican (regional), and federal.  According to 1991 data from
the Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Ministry, the
government collected about one billion rubles as pollution fees,
penalties, and compensation for environmental damage.  The main
source was the fee for allowed pollution (65%).  Above-standardpollution fees constituted 14.8%, actions - 9.3%, penalties -
2.6%, and other sources - 8.6%.  Penalties and compensation
constituted only 12% of the total.  Clearly, fees for allowed
pollution became the main source of environmental funds.  In
1991, the government transferred 25.1 million rubles (2.6%) to
the federal environmental fund.
An analysis of how the government allocated environmental funds
resources showed that they spent only 53.2%.  At the end of 1991,
0.4 billion rubles remained in the fund.  After policymakers
raised prices on Jan. 1, 1992, the funds depreciated more than 10
times.
Why did the government leave such a large sum unspent?  The
explanation may lie in the importance of regions having the
institutional structure for managing environmental protection.
As a rule, the regions that participated in the experiment from
1989 to 1990 were better prepared to introduce pollution fees.
The only exception was Moscow.  The 47% of funds it spent was
lower than in other participating cities.  The reason lies in the
conflicts between legislative and executive authorities who could
not agree on how and where to spend the money.
A major problem that surfaced during the experiment as well as
afterwards was collecting payments from polluting enterprises.
Because there was no legal basis for collecting pollution fees,
paying them was voluntary.  As a result, many enterprises simply
refused to pay.  The government sued them with little success.
In Moscow, of the 95 cases that went to court or arbitration,
only 16 were resolved in favor of Moscompriroda (the Moscow
Environmental Committee).  The enterprises that refused to pay
were often large, monopolistic factories that had political and
economic power in both local and federal governments.  For
example, in 1990, the auto manufacturer ZIL did not pay the 10
million rubles it owed the environmental fund.  In 1991, electric
power stations in Moscow (Mosenergo plants) also refused to pay.
According to estimates, if the government had collected fees and
satisfied all actions, the environmental fund would have
collected about 200 million rubles in Moscow alone.  The
Environmental Protection Act of 1992 took into account all these
aspects.
THE 1992 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT: DEVELOPING A FEE SYSTEM
The 1992 Environmental Protection Act legalized the system of
pollution fees that had been in operation since 1989.  Chapter
III, Article 20 of the Act established fees for allowed and
above-limit emissions.  The Act stressed polluters'
unquestionable obligation to pay the fees, thereby eliminating
any basis for contesting them.  Furthermore, the Act required all
polluters to have licenses.  The licensee had to sign an
agreement that fixed fees for allowed and above-limit pollution.Such an agreement had as much judicial force as any other
document and was the basis for fulfilling Article 20.  The
Russian government settled payment rates, but executive
authorities could change them.  On Aug. 28, 1992, the government
adopted a procedure for calculating fees and a marginal level for
pollution and other harmful influences (Russian Council of
Ministers 1992).
The Act also increased the 1991 fees fivefold and expanded the
possibilities for regional differences.  Regional authorities,
with the federal government's help, defined regional differences.
They planned to introduce a new payment system with regional
differences in 1993.  They were to add fees for other types of
harmful activities such as noise, vibrations, electromagnetic
fields, or radiation.
The Act established a system whereby environmental funds would be
outside the general budget (analogous to the Social Security
Trust Fund in the United States).  The system has three levels.
The highest is the federal fund.  The medium level is the
regional (republican) fund.  The lowest level is the local
(municipal) fund.  According to the Act, 10% of pollution fees go
to the general federal fund and the remaining 90% go to maintain
environmental authorities.  Of this latter allocation, 60% went
to the local fund, 30% to the regional fund, and 10% to the
federal fund.  This fixed, legalized procedure regulates the
allocation of pollution fees collected.
OTHER ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
The Taxation Act (Russian Supreme Soviet 1991) exempted up to
30% of "profits" allocated for environmental purposes from the
profit tax.  The Environmental Protection Act outlined broader
tax privileges.  But these privileges can be used together only
if there are corresponding changes in other laws, which are
unlikely.  The Russian Finance Ministry opposes such changes
fearing they would further worsen Russian budget deficits.
It would be interesting to follow incentives arising from
existing tax preferences, but such data are unavailable.
However, Golub's unpublished analyses suggest that the current
system of taxation, fees, and preferences do not create enough
incentive for businesses to allocate resources to the
environment.  If all environmental investments were tax-exempt
and free from value-added taxes, the pollution fee should be no
less than 48% of the necessary abatement costs.  Otherwise, the
fee should be substantially higher.ANALYSIS OF THE POLLUTION FEE SYSTEM'S FIRST RESULTS
Our study's main purpose was to compare the effectiveness of the
pollution fee system and the command-and-control system of
environmental management.  Because the system was new, we wanted
to identify the direction of fee development and enforcement.
Furthermore, we conducted our study during an economic crisis and
had to eliminate those influences.
As a result, we based our analysis on case studies.  To
understand the effectiveness of the pollution fee system, we
analyzed the dynamics of investments in environmental protection.
Investments were cut three times in 1992 compared with 1990.  But
according to expert estimations, the average investment reduction
from 1990 to 1992 was twofold (Shatalin 1994).  The economic
crisis can only partially explain this reduction.  Further
curtailment means that new investment sources did not reach the
1990 levels.  Why?  In Russia, there are now two main sources of
environmental investments [note 7].   They are environmental
funds (collected pollution fees) and abatement investments of the
polluting enterprises.
Polluting enterprises invest their own resources in abatement
equipment if it is more profitable than paying pollution fees.
>From our analyses, we concluded that, given the existing economic
difficulties, pollution fees are not providing sufficient
incentives for enterprises to apply their own resources for
environmental purposes.
Using data on abatement investments and expected emissions
reduction, we compared the volume of air emission fees with the
level of investments.  Our calculations showed that the amount of
investment necessary to reduce emissions was several times higher
than the pollution fee for that emission.  For the energy sector
and for ferrous metallurgy, we calculated the ratio between the
investments needed to reduce emissions by an amount V, I(V), and
the amount of fees, P(V), that the enterprise would save if it
made the investments I(V).  The ratio I(V)/P(V) was 4.2 to 11.6
for the energy sector and 3.3 to 12.2 for ferrous metallurgy.
The upper and lower limits were defined by the hypothesis about
sharing penalties.  If we consider almost all fees as penalties,
then they do not create effective incentives in these industries.
For almost all industries, abatement costs exceeded the level of
pollution fees by less than 2.3 to 2.8 times.
>From these results, we conclude that pollution fees have not
created sufficient incentives to motivate polluting enterprises
to invest in abatement.   Similar results from a survey of 65
large enterprises in 24 regions confirmed our conclusions (Dumnov
1992).  The survey showed that, on average, enterprises spent
0.2% of their total annual receipts on pollution fees.  Every
fifth enterprise did not pay pollution fees.  Though the
pollution payments had only a minor effect on profits, 80% ofbusiness leaders surveyed said they had increased their
production prices to compensate.  The pollution fee receipts
would have been 70% greater if all fees had actually been paid.
None of those surveyed considered environmental investments
necessary.  Therefore, it is doubtful that this environmental
investment source was significant.
The other source of pollution prevention investment was the
environmental fund.  But, as mentioned earlier, because the
pollution fees were seldom collected, they were too low to
provide adequate resources.  In 1991, the government could not
collect pollution payments because of judicial wrangling.  In
1992, it could not collect them because most enterprises were
nearly bankrupt.  Businesses paid only 33% of 2.7 billion rubles
owed the environmental fund in the first two quarters.  After
large-scale credits from the Russian Central Bank in the summer
of 1992, many enterprises managed to cancel their pollution fee
debt.
Surprisingly, there have been many positive results from the
pollution fee system.  First, pollution fees initiated a new
environmental management system.  Case studies have shown that
the pollution fee system provided the impetus for Russia to
develop a monitoring system.  Second, it caused a sharp increase
in the number of enterprises with set Maximum Permissible
Concentrations and Temporary Coordinated Levels of emissions.
The Moscow and Vologda experiences suggested this result though
data were not available for the entire country.  Third, the two-
tier pollution fee system stimulated many polluting enterprises
to sign agreements with the environmental agencies that outlined
their strategy for reducing pollution.  Without a signed
agreement, the agency considered an enterprises' emissions
above-limit and subject to much higher penalties.  These
enterprises also had no fixed Temporary Coordinated Level
standards.  Thus, assembling all the documents necessary to
establish their permissible volume of emissions benefitted those
enterprises.
Last, the environmental fund supported by pollution charges
promoted the development of a market for environmental services.
At first, it was hard to spend money because the market for
abatement equipment was limited.  In addition, the decisionmaking
procedure for allocating resources was unclear and a source of
conflict between executive and legislative authorities.
Our analysis showed that the regions that spent the largest
percentage of their resources on abatement were those that had
participated in the experiment. Of these, three-fourths spent 80%
or more of their own resources in 1991.  This fact testifies to
the tremendous capacity of environmental authorities and the new
environmental management system to adapt quickly to forming
market conditions.
ENDNOTES1. Fundamental acts are short laws that establish the framework
upon which other laws are built.
2. For example, the US National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
SOB are 0.08 mg/m cubed (primary annual), 0.365 mg/m cubed
(primary 24-hour) and 1.3 mg/m cubed (secondary 3-hour)
(Tietenberg 1992).
3. Maximum Permissible Concentration was exceeded by a factor of
6 in Donetsk and Osh, 5.3 in Frunze and Rustavi, 4 in Fergana,
and 3.4 in Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, and Makeevka.
4. Maximum Permissible Concentrations were exceeded by a factor
of 6.2 in Astrakhan, 4.8 in Kirovakan, 4.4 in Krivoy Rog, 4 in
Norilsk and Novotroitsk, 3.8 in Grozny, and 3 in Cheljabinsk,
Saratov, Jaroslavl, and Donetsk.
5. State standard N 17.02.3.02 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.
ATMOSPHERE.  RULES FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE PERMISSIBLE LEVELS OF
HARMFUL COMPONENTS CONCENTRATION IN THE EMISSIONS OF INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES.
6. The standard model for air pollution is the Ephir model.
7. We did not include credits or bonds because their high
interest rates are unbearable for comparatively poor-performing
investments.
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